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We analyze judicial policy lines concerning the punishment of environmental crime using a 
unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case-specific information on 
offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by lower criminal courts as well as 
their follow-up by the relevant court of appeal. The sanctioning policy of the courts proofs to 
be varied as well as consistent. Judges carefully balance effective and suspended penalties, 
most often using them cumulatively, but in specific cases opting to use them as substitutes. 
Overall, both judges in lower and appeal courts balance environmental law and classic criminal 
law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions as well as the environment. 
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I. Introduction.  
In a world where firms and individuals do not automatically comply with legislation, 
monitoring and enforcement strategies are necessary elements of an effective and well-
designed environmental policy. As a recent overview by Gray and Shimshack (2011) of the 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of environmental enforcement in the US shows, 
monitoring and enforcement activities generate not only reductions in violations, but also 
significant reductions in emissions. In general, enforceable regulations are often cited as a 
dominant factor explaining the substantial improvements in environmental quality in 
developed countries over the last four decades (see, e.g., Kagan et al. 2003). 
Enforcement typically involves a range of policy choices such as monitoring strategies by state 
or federal agencies (e.g. Rousseau 2007), self-policing by facilities (e.g. Toffel and Short 2011) 
and the imposition of administrative and criminal sanctions as well as civil sanctions (e.g. Gray 
and Shimshack 2011). One of the less documented phases of the environmental enforcement 
process is the sanctioning policy applied by criminal courts. In this contribution, we construct a 
comprehensive picture of judicial policy lines in the punishment of environmental crime in the 
Flemish Region (Flanders) in Belgium. Our dataset, a collection of individual criminal cases 
that is unique in Europe, includes case-specific information on offenses, offenders and imposed 
sanctions and follows cases up to the appeal phase. To start, we investigate three decisions 
made by criminal judges in the courts of first instance: first whether a prosecuted defendant 
should be acquitted; next whether the offense should be punished with an effective penalty, a 
suspended penalty or a combination of both; and finally what the level of the effective and/or 
suspended penalty should be. Next, we analyze whether appeal judges confirm or adapt the 
initial verdicts and, if verdicts are adapted, we study the size and direction of these changes. 
Judicial behavior has been extensively studied from a behavioral law and economics viewpoint 
(e.g. Guthrie et al. 2001). Prior to the emergence of this strand of literature, Marks (1988) was 
one of the first to state that behavior of judges can be examined in a rationality-based setting. 
Since the 1980s, a significant body of theoretical research has been developed to understand 
judicial behavior (see Spiller and Gely (2007) for a US based overview). Yet, most studies are 
framed within a common law context. Thus not all results, for instance those relating to the 
importance of judicial precedence (Rasmusen 1994; Levy 2003), carry over to a civil law 
context. Fon and Parisi (2006), e.g., state that judicial precedent can be a central component of 
judicial decision making in civil law countries but that its influence depends on the demand for 
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consistency with previous case law. The rule of precedence can even become irrelevant, when 
the law gives judges broad discretionary freedom. Typically this applies to the determination of 
sanctions within the criminal law system of civil law countries: judges have extensive 
discretionary freedom when deciding on the type and level of sanctions in criminal cases, and 
thus the rule of precedence fades away in this subject area. With regard to Belgium, a civil law 
country, this analysis is corroborated by a recent study by Monsieurs et al. (2009) who 
surveyed Belgian judges with criminal case loads and found that the influence of judicial 
precedent is very limited in the sanctioning decision process. 
An overview of the determinants of monetary sanctions imposed in practice following 
environmental offenses is provided by Rousseau (2009). Based on international empirical 
evidence, she studies the determinants and levels of administrative, criminal as well as civil 
fines inflicted for environmental offenses. Three major categories of variables are identified: 
the circumstances of the offense, offenders’ characteristics, and indirect institutional effects. 
Some general trends emerge: fines increase with the harm caused by the offense (Earnhart 
1997; Kleit et al. 1998; Oljaca et al. 1998), and fines are higher for repeat offenders as well as 
for intentional offenses (Kleit et al. 1998; Oljaca et al. 1998). Also, the studies discussed 
indicate that institutional factors matter (Earnhart 1997; Ringquist 1998; White 2006).  
However, only a couple of empirical studies deal with criminal sanctions for environmental 
offenses, as opposed to administrative and civil sanctions. In one of the first empirical studies 
dealing with criminal environmental sanctions, Cohen (1992) analyzed the fines imposed by 
US federal criminal courts on firms sentenced between 1984 and 1990. He found that the 
particular type of violated legislation had a sizeable impact on the size of the fine imposed on 
convicted corporations. Also, large corporations received higher fines than small ones. Further, 
Billiet and Rousseau (2003) performed an analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal 
of Gent (Belgium) for the period 1990-2000 concerning waste water discharge permits. The 
fines imposed in first instance were higher when the defendant had a criminal record and for 
infractions on the Flemish Environmental Permitting Act 1985. As in the rest of the EU, 
environmental permitting legislation is a centerpiece of environmental regulation in Flanders. 
Billiet and Rousseau (2003) also found that, contrary to the rulings in first instance, the appeal 
judges considered both the violator’s intentions and the harm caused to third parties. Finally, 
Blondiau and Rousseau (2010) studied the impact of a judge’s objective function on the 
criminal sanctions (fine or plant closure) inflicted to corporate entities to enforce 
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environmental standards. Using a subset2 of the dataset used here, they found that judges 
explicitly take social sanctioning costs into account next to environmental damages. 
While the previously discussed studies yield interesting insights into sanctioning decisions for 
environmental offenses, none of them provides a detailed picture of judicial policy lines in 
determining criminal sanctions. They do not explicitly take the variety of different judicial 
policy options available to judges into account, nor do they study the complete path of criminal 
cases up to the appeal court. Thus our current study analyzes judicial sanctioning decisions in a 
more general framework by including the different sanctioning possibilities such as the option 
to postpone a conviction and the use of suspended or effective sanctions, from first instance 
level to appeal. The analysis allows us not only to identify broad trends in criminal judicial 
decision making, such as leniency towards offenders that took positive actions to limit 
damages, but also to investigate the specific factors determining sanctioning decisions for 
particular offenses, such as violations of environmental permitting requirements. Moreover, we 
are able to study the use of suspended sanctions by criminal judges: are such sentences used as 
substitutes for effective sentences or are both types of sentence used cumulatively? For 
instance, we show that the cumulative use of effective and suspended sanctions is the general 
policy line when judges deal with corporate entities. Finally, we identify the changes made by 
appeal judges to first instance rulings and are therefore able to comment on the consistency in 
sanctioning decisions through the different layers of the criminal court system in Belgium. 
In section 2 we describe the legal background to the criminal sanctioning of environmental 
offenses in Flanders. In section 3 we formulate the hypotheses that will be empirically tested. 
The data, model and variables used in the analysis are summarized in section 4, while the 
results are presented in section 5 and discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
II. Background to the criminal sanctioning of environmental offenses in Flanders 
Since our empirical analysis deals with the criminal enforcement of environmental legislation 
in Flanders, Belgium, we provide a short overview of the most relevant characteristics of the 
criminal sanctioning system in that country3.  
                                                            
2 Blondiau and Rousseau (2010) analyze sanctions imposed on corporate entities by lower courts only, while the 
current study analyses sanctions imposed on individuals and corporate entities by lower courts and appeal court. 
3 We limit the information to the law that applied when the cases in our dataset were handled by the criminal court 
system. Subsequent changes are not relevant. 
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2.1 Prosecution decision 
Public prosecutors in Flanders decide to prosecute in about 8% of the environmental cases that 
reach their office4. Prosecution guidelines regarding the decision to prosecute and the type and 
level of sanctions to request from the bench do not exist in Belgian criminal procedure law. In 
May 2000 the Council of Prosecutors-General did approve a memorandum identifying the 
environmental offenses that rate priority in the prosecution policy (Environmental Prosecution 
Memorandum). The prioritized offenses are essentially those that have or might have serious 
consequences for public health and the environment, have an organized crime character, are 
committed in a professional context, or concern the exploitation of a facility or activity without 
the required environmental permits. This memorandum, however, does not bind the 
prosecutors at all. Thus, the prosecutor’s discretion concerning the decision to prosecute or not 
and, if prosecuting, the selection of sanctions to request, is very broad. 
2.2 Criminal sanctioning decision  
Criminal court judges have three main options to shape a sanctioning policy. Firstly, if the 
criminal court finds facts and liability proven, which happens in nine out of ten cases, the court 
has to choose between a postponement of conviction and an actual conviction. Postponement 
of conviction, basically a choice not to punish, is subject to a probation period of one to five 
years in which the offender must not reoffend.  
Secondly, if the criminal court opts for a conviction, it has to impose at least one principal 
sanction. Belgian criminal law knows three principal sanctions, which all have a punitive 
character: imprisonment, fines and community service5. It is legally possible, and common, to 
impose more than one principal penalty: for instance combining a fine with a prison sentence 
(Billiet and Rousseau, forthcoming). For each selected principal penalty, the judge also needs 
to determine the penalty level within the minimum and maximum limits set by the legislator. 
The range of legally allowed penalties is typically very broad. The statutes used in our dataset 
provide for fines ranging from minimum 26 euro to maximum 10 000 000 euro and for prison 
                                                            
4 Some 60% of the Flemish environmental cases end with a dismissal and 14% with a settlement. About half of 
the dismissals have a technical motivation such as lack of evidence, while the other dismissals are based on policy 
reasons, often the motivation that the situation has been regularized. Thus rectifying the illegal situation seems 
more important to prosecutors than punishing the offending party. 
5 A community service consists of a number of hours that the convicted person needs to work for free for a public 
or non-profit organization. This sanction is seldom used in Flanders (see Table 1). If used, it most often punishes 
illegal waste dumping by people in financial distress and usually involves waste clean-up. 
6 
 
sentences with a minimum of 8 days and a maximum of 5 years (Billiet et al. 2009). Note that 
the Belgian Criminal Code includes a conversion mechanism of prison sentences to fines that 
applies whenever the offender is a legal entity. We used this mechanism in our analysis to 
convert prison sentences imposed on convicted individuals to monetary equivalents6.  
The last main policy choice of the criminal court relates to the possibility to suspend penalty 
execution, partially or completely. As a postponement of the verdict, a suspension of penalty 
execution is always linked with a probationary period of maximum 5 years. Both options put a 
clear emphasis on individual deterrence. Suspension of the execution of penalties is a prevalent 
option in criminal courts throughout the European Union, where it is commonly seen as a 
means to prevent recidivism (Commission of the European Communities, 2004).  
Also, a criminal judge can impose one or more additional – punitive or remedial – sanctions7, 
if and when he has imposed at least one principal penalty, suspended or not. Most often, judges 
disregard this option and shape their environmental sanctioning policy through principal 
penalties only, fine-tuning them by using the aforementioned three main options. 
Thus, criminal judges develop a policy within very broad legal margins. Moreover, they are not 
guided by sentencing guidelines, since such guidelines do not exist in Belgian criminal law. 
Also, criminal judges are not bound by the public prosecutor’s sanctioning request nor, as 
mentioned earlier, by the penalty imposed in previous similar cases. The only decisive factor in 
the sanctioning decision is the criterion of proportionality with ‘the seriousness of the offense’: 
the criminal judge has to punish ‘in proportion to the seriousness of the offense’. This basic 
sentencing criterion8, which was developed by Belgian Supreme Court and which applies to all 
types of criminal cases, includes two sub-criteria: the objective gravity of facts as such and the 
culpability of the defendant. The gravity of the facts is rated by the extent to which the 
                                                            
6 We compare differences in maximum fines with differences in maximum prison sentences for different 
regulations to calculate the implicit monetary value that the legislator assigns to prison sentences. Firms cannot be 
imprisoned, so there has to be a difference in the legal maxima for the fines that can be imposed on individuals 
and on firms to secure a non-discriminatory treatment. Using these differences, we derived an (approximate) 
equivalent monetary value for a prison sentence: 100000 + 100000 0.497(prison sentence in months) euro. 
7 Forfeiture of illegal benefits (the most frequently used punitive additional sanction), and the injunction to cease a 
business operation (the most frequently used remedial one) are each imposed in only 5% of convictions (Billiet et 
al. 2009, Billiet and Broeckhoven 2011, Billiet and Rousseau 2012). In Belgium, as in many other EU-countries, 
remedial sanctions for environmental offenses traditionally belong to the realm of administrative enforcement. 
8 The case law of the Belgian Supreme Court meets a general principle of criminal law with its attachment to this 
basic criterion. The requirement of proportionality between the criminal offense and the severity of penalties has 
been enshrined in many fundamental laws and treaties, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Pb. 2007,  C 303) that is binding since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 13 December 2007. 
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unlawful activities harmed or might have harmed the public interest protected by the violated 
legislation. Looking at Belgian legislation, the public interest that the environmental statutes 
aim to protect from harm always consists of (an aspect of) the natural environment (water, air, 
biodiversity, …), which is protected for anthropocentric reasons (with a strong focus on health 
issues), or because of the intrinsic value of the natural environment, or for both these reasons.  
The assessment of and the importance attached to harm by the Belgian Supreme Court are in 
line with the focus on harm in the existing law and economics literature on optimal penalties 
(e.g., Polinsky and Shavell 1979, 1992; Garoupa 2001, Rousseau and Telle 2010). Also, the 
theory of marginal deterrence, developed by Shavell (1992) and Mookherjee and Png (1994), 
which holds that optimal penalties rise with the harmfulness of acts and should reach the 
extreme only for the most harmful acts, constitutes an approach that matches the 
proportionality principle set out by the Supreme Court. To conclude, the actual and potential 
harm associated with the prosecuted offense as well as the culpability of the offender are two 
key factors in determining the applicable penalty. 
2.3 Some additional key features 
Since the 19th century the Belgian Supreme Court has adamantly upheld the requirement of an 
intentional element (guilt) in order to conclude to an offense that can be punished by criminal 
law 9. Strict liability does not belong to the sanctioning logic. Further, legal persons are 
criminally liable since 1999 and can be prosecuted and punished together with natural persons 
involved in the same criminal case. Under the Belgian Criminal Code, legal persons incur 
criminal liability directly as entities on their own. Thus it is not necessary to identify one or 
more natural persons, be it leading persons or employees, who have been committing offenses 
for the legal person (Van den Wyngaert 2009, Vermeulen et al. 2012). 
Individuals as well as corporate entities who consider themselves harmed by the offense under 
consideration, can become a civil party in the criminal case. If the defendant is convicted, the 
judge will also rule on civil claims and, if necessary, award damages. 
                                                            
9 The basic form of guilt, dolus generalis, is most often depicted as the requirement to have acted ‘knowingly and 
willingly’, meaning that one committed the illegal conduct as such knowingly and willingly; it is not required to 
also have been knowing and willing concerning the illegal character of the conduct. This concept of ‘guilt’ is 
completed by two so-called ‘grounds of exclusion of guilt’: irresistible constraint and insurmountable erring or 
ignorance. Together, the idea of guilt and the grounds of exclusion of guilt make that unlawful behaviour 
committed with negligence is included within the array of punishable behaviour in Belgium. 
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Judgments pronounced by the court of first instance can be appealed by each of the concerned 
parties with the competent court of appeal. If the prosecutor appeals, which he systematically 
does when a defendant appeals, the appeal judge is completely free in determining punishment: 
he can reduce, confirm or increase the verdict pronounced by the judge of first instance. 
The Criminal Prosecution Code obliges criminal judges to explicitly motivate the choice as 
well as the severity of each of the sanctions they impose, whenever they have discretion to 
choose between two or more sanctions, and to set the level of a selected sanction between a 
legal minimum and maximum. The motivation is allowed to be short, but must be precise. This 
obligation typically applies for all principal penalties. 
In contrast to some other countries, the Belgian legal system does not have specialized 
environmental prosecutors nor specialized environmental courts10. Yet, as in the rest of Europe 
and the world (Pring and Pring 2009), there is an increasing demand for such specialization 
due to the complexity of environmental issues and legislation. 
 
III. Hypotheses 
In this section we formulate three hypotheses concerning judicial policy in the punishment of 
environmental crime. These are then confronted with practice using our dataset for Flanders.  
As previously discussed, the criminal judge has to punish in proportion to the gravity of the 
facts, which primarily aims at the actual and potential harm those facts brought along (see, e.g., 
US Sentencing Commission 1993, 2008, UK Sentencing Advisory Panel 2000). Actual and 
potential harm can be measured in several ways. However, not all measures are equally 
objective and easy to assess. Some measures for harm are easy to grasp, such as whether efforts 
were made to put an end to the offense or to clean up the pollution caused and the presence of 
civil parties in the case seeking compensation for harm suffered, while others require a more 
specialized knowledge such as whether the offense violated noise regulations or not. Also 
tangible and measurable harm, such as a given amount of waste, can more readily be assessed 
than some other more hidden types of harm, such as soil and groundwater contamination. 
Given that Belgian criminal courts are not specialized in environmental crime but deal with a 
                                                            
10 There exists one exception: the Flemish Environmental Enforcement Act of 2007 created the Environmental 
Enforcement Court of the Flemish Region, an administrative court that controls the legality of administrative 
decisions imposing monetary sanctions for environmental offenses. 
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variety of cases, judges might rely more heavily on objective case elements that require little 
specialized knowledge. Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: When judges have little specific environmental expertise, easily verifiable 
factors will have more weight on the level of the imposed penalty than less tangible factors. 
Besides the level of the penalty, judges can also choose between effective and suspended 
penalties. Suspended penalties were introduced in Belgium to solve the practical problems 
related to short prison sentences (Van den Wyngaert 2009). Problems such as insufficient room 
in prisons and the difficulty of integrating ex-convicts in society could be mitigated by using 
suspended sentences instead of effective sanctions without completely compromising the 
deterrent effect of the sanction. The use of suspended penalties soon spread from prison 
sentences to criminal fines. Consistent with the historical roots of suspended penalties, the 
general idea, supported by the country’s high courts (e.g. Constitutional Court 2004/105 and 
2008/157) and literature (e.g. Van den Wyngaert 2009), is that the use of suspended penalties 
expresses leniency: judges would substitute effective sanctions by suspended sanctions, which 
implies a negative link between the level of the effective sanction and that of the suspended 
sanction. However, this interpretation of the policy tool is not mandatory. Thus, logically, 
judges might also use effective and suspended sanctions cumulatively as two specific parts of 
an imposed sanction. This leads to a second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: When suspended penalties are considered as a less stringent substitute for 
effective penalties, the stringency of effective and suspended penalties has to be negatively 
correlated. 
While in principle institutional factors should not matter, the evidence suggests that in practice 
they do. For instance, a republican president in power in the US led to lower environmental 
fines (Ringquist 1998). The sanctioning procedures matters as well, e.g. fines increased with 
the number of defendants in White (2006). Also, Rousseau and Billiet (2005) showed that the 
judging decisions in the Court of Appeal of Gent were based on different characteristics than 
the judging behavior in the lower courts. More than lower courts, higher courts tend to preserve 
the core principles and goals of the law submitted to them. Throughout all different types of 
criminality, the hard core of the judicial work of criminal courts is common criminal law. In 
Belgium, common criminal law centers around 19th century ideas of personal guilt as the 
reason for punishment and the necessity to limit the right of the state to punish its citizens to 
the most essential values of society. Besides the security of the nation, the goals our common 
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criminal law recognizes as essential are the protection of individual property and of the 
individual’s life and physical integrity. Rousseau and Billiet (2005) found that this typical 
criminal law rationale surfaced in the judicial policy of the Court of Appeal of Gent regarding 
offenses concerning waste water permits, even if the environmental statutes involved aimed at 
different goals: the protection of the environment for anthropocentric reasons (public health) as 
well as the intrinsic value of the natural environment as such. Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3: When higher courts focus on the preservation of the core principles of law, 
judgments from the courts of first instance regarding environmental offenses are more likely 
to reflect the core principles of environmental law, while judgments from the court of appeal 
regarding such offenses are more likely to reflect the core principles of criminal law. 
These hypotheses are confronted with reality by testing the influence of variables relating to 
the gravity of the facts, the harm they brought along, the protection of the property and well-
being of individuals as well as the culpability of the offender on the type and level of criminal 
sanctions imposed by the judges. 
 
IV. Data 
In this section we first describe the dataset (4.1). Next we discuss the model that is estimated 
(4.2) and define the dependent (4.3) and the explanatory variables (4.4). 
4.1 Description of the dataset 
To document the criminal decision process in Flanders, we studied all verdicts at 7 courts of 
first instance and the Court of Appeal of Gent of the complete environmental case law from 
2003 to 2007 (Billiet et al. 2009; Billiet et al. 2011)11. The different environmental statutes 
enforced in the dataset are listed in Appendix A. We collected data on 1034 cases, of which 
912 were decided by the courts of first instance, while 122 were concluded in appeal. In total, 
1617 defendants were tried in these 1034 criminal prosecutions: 1352 only in first instance and 
265 both in first instance and in appeal. Some 80% of the defendants are individuals, while 
                                                            
11 The data were collected within the SBO-project “Environmental law enforcement: A comparison of practice in 
the criminal and administrative tracks” (2007-2011), see www.environmental-lawforce.be. The dataset concerns 
Brugge, Dendermonde, Gent, Ieper, Kortrijk, Oudenaarde and Veurne. We collected data for 7 out of the 13 
judicial districts in Flanders. All appeals at these 7 courts are dealt with by the Court of Appeal of Gent, one of the 
five Belgian courts of appeal. 
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20% are legal entities. Since each defendant can face several accusations, the cases include 
3561 accusations, of which 3004 were dealt with in first instance and 557 in appeal. 
A limited number of legislative texts dominate the case law: over two in three accusations 
involve violations of the Flemish Environmental Permitting Act 1985 and the Flemish Waste 
Act 198112. The other charges that were brought to court mainly concern violations of manure 
and noise legislation. Judgments also contain information on the type of pollution or nuisance 
that took place. Waste problems (34%) and noise nuisance (14%) are most frequently cited, 
followed by water pollution (9%) and soil contamination (7%). Descriptions of the harm that 
was caused are scarce. When harm is explicitly mentioned, the decisions refer in general to 
damage done to public health or the health of third parties (8% combined). Environmental 
damage to fauna and flora is stated less often (5% in total), while damage to the property of 
third parties is hardly mentioned at all (less than 1%). 
In first instance, judges convict three in four defendants, one in eight is acquitted, and for the 
remaining defendants the conviction is postponed. The appeal judges convict a similar part of 
the defendants (three in four), but appear to acquit more defendants (one in six). Looking at the 
type of sanctions, we find that the monetary fine is by far the most used criminal sanctioning 
instrument, since it is imposed in over 95% of the convictions. For corporations, the average 
fines – including the legal correction factor – amount to 14569€ in first instance and 10733€ in 
appeal. For individuals, the average fines are significantly lower: 3787€ in first instance and 
8061€ in appeal. Also, for individuals, it is noteworthy that in 10 to 15% of the convictions a 
prison sentence (combined with a fine) is imposed (see table 1). The average duration of a 
prison sentence is 4.4 months in first instance and 6.2 months in appeal.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Description of the estimation 
We investigate the main policy choices made by judges once the facts are established and the 
imputation issue is solved. We analyze sanctioning decisions concerning corporate entities 
separately from those concerning individual defendants. To correct for a possible sample 
selection bias, we first estimate a probit model to study the decision to acquit or convict a 
defendant. Next, we estimate two OLS models to analyze the level of the effective sanction and 
                                                            
12 Over half of the accusations dealt with 3 articles of law: the prohibition to discard waste, the environmental 
permit obligation and the obligation to comply with the exploitation conditions in environmental permits. 
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the level of the suspended sanction respectively, each including the inverse Mill’s ratio based 
on the preceding probit results (see figure 1). To deal with the issue of identification, we use 
the ratio of proven accusations to the total number of accusations (PROVEN ACC) as an 
independent variable to explain the decision to acquit or convict a defendant, while this 
variable is not included to explain the sanction levels since judges cannot base their 
sanctioning decisions on non-proven accusations. Postponements of verdicts are included in 
the analysis as a zero effective and zero suspended sanction. Note that the effective sanction is 
included as a random regressor in our specification of the suspended sanction. It was not 
possible to use an instrumental variable approach or a SUR approach in our analysis since both 
effective and suspended sanctions are – and legally should be – explained by identical 
regressors. Legally we cannot identify any reason why effective and suspended sanctions 
should be determined by even one different factor and thus our model reflect this reality.  
 
Figure 1: Model description 
 
After the analysis of the sentences formulated in first instance, we estimate the probability that 
an appeal is initiated, either by one or more of the defendants, by civil parties or by the public 
prosecutor. Again, the probit estimation of the probability that a verdict was appealed is 
necessary to correct for a possible sample selection bias through the inclusion of the inverse 
Mill’s ratio in the later estimations. To explain the probability of appeal we include the level 
and the square of the effective sanction, while these variables are not included in the estimation 
of the changes in sanction levels. We study how the appeal judges modify the verdicts imposed 
by lower courts and we explicitly distinguish between the changes in effective sanctions and 
the changes in suspended sanctions. Thus we estimate six functions in total for each group of 



















4.3 Definition of the dependent variables 
The dependent variables for the analysis of the judgments in first instance are: CONV 
expressing whether a judge acquits a defendant (CONV=0) or not (CONV=1), LN(EFFSAN) 
expressing the logarithm of the effective sanction level; and LN(SUSSAN) expressing the 
logarithm of the suspended sanction level. To calculate the level of the sanctions imposed by 
the criminal court, we look at the sum that the offender actually needs to pay, including the 
legal correction factor. Also, we aggregate fines and prison sentences using the conversion 
mechanism of jail sentences to fines implied in the Criminal Code (see section 2). 
Looking at the appeal phase, we see that the public prosecutor appealed against the first 
instance judgment in all our appeal cases, either as primary or secondary party. Because of this, 
the appeal judges faced no additional constraints in modifying the initial verdict: they were free 
to reduce, confirm or increase the sanction imposed by the lower courts. Thus, the dependent 
variables for these analyses are: APPEAL indicating whether at least one of the parties 
appealed the initial verdict (APPEAL=1) or not; DIF-EFFSAN expressing the change (in euro) 
between the effective sanction in appeal and the effective sanction initially imposed in first 
instance; and DIF-SUSSAN expressing the change (in euro) between the suspended sanction in 
appeal and the suspended sanction imposed in first instance. Since the differences in effective 
and suspended sanctions between first instance and appeal can be both positive and negative, 
depending on whether appeal judges increase or decrease the sanction, we can no longer use a 
logarithmic transformation and use the absolute differences in fine levels. 
4.4 Definition of the explanatory variables 
To investigate the judicial sanctioning policy in more detail, we analyze the impact of several 
explanatory variables13 on the decision processes. To a large extent, these explanatory variables 
aim at measuring the impact of the seriousness of the offense on the sanctioning policy, 
including the gravity of the facts (i.e. actual and potential harm) as well as the culpability of the 
offender. Further, we include some variables concerning the type of offender and to control for 
differences between courts and for time trends. A summary of the definitions of dependent and 
explanatory variables can be found in appendix B. 
                                                            
13 Because some variables become highly correlated when the sample sizes decrease for the estimations relating to 
the appeal decision, not all explanatory variables are included in each of the appeal level estimations. 
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4.4.1 Variables concerning the type of offender 
The offender is either a corporate entity, an individual offending during his/her professional 
activities (PROF=1), or an individual offending during his/her private activities (PROF=0). 
Our dataset includes 17% corporate entities, 35% ‘professional’ and 48% ‘private’ offenders. 
4.4.2 Variables concerning the seriousness of the offense 
We describe the seriousness of the offense using three categories: a) variables mainly dealing 
with the gravity of the facts, b) variables that concern both the gravity of the facts and the 
culpability of the offender, and c) variables mainly concerning the culpability of the offender. 
Variables concerning the gravity of the facts 
The total number of accusations a defendant has to answer for, is given by the variable 
COUNT ACC. The variable PROVEN ACC represents the total number of proven accusations 
incorporated in the verdict. In our analysis only descriptive information concerning proven 
offenses is used to construct the variables of the sanctioning policy as only those offenses lead 
to punishment. In first instance (appeal), each offender was held liable on average for 2.1 (2.7) 
proven accusations. The variable DURATION expresses the length of the longest-lasting 
offense in days. The average duration of the longest-lasting offense was 505 days in first 
instance. When the judgment stated that one or more offenses were detected during an audit of 
the Flemish Environmental Inspectorate, the variable EPA equals one. This holds for 12% of 
the offenders in first instance. The Agency typically focuses its monitoring activities on 
facilities that are relatively more damaging to public health and the environment. 
Further, we know whether one or more of the offenses committed by the offender classifies as 
a prioritized offense in line with the aforementioned Environmental Prosecution Memorandum 
(PRIORITY=1). Some 23% of the offenders committed at least one prioritized offense based 
on first instance verdicts. The judgments can also describe the damage caused by the offenses. 
Thus we identify offenses damaging vulnerable ecosystems, fauna or flora (NATURE=1), and 
offenses damaging public and/or private health (HEALTH=1). In first instance, 3.6% of the 
offenses were harmful to nature and 8% were harmful to health. In appeal, these percentages 
increase to 4.6% and 27%, respectively. 
The indicator variable CIVIL PARTY represents whether one or more civil parties, seeking 
compensation for damage caused to themselves or their property, were involved in the case or 
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not. In first instance, one or more civil parties were involved in the case of approximately 15% 
of the offenders, in appeal the percentage was some 26%. As a rule, civil parties are private 
individuals, however occasionally they include local or regional public authorities. 
Also, we know whether the offender violated the obligation to have a valid environmental 
permit (PERMIT=1) or the conditions stated in the environmental permit (PERMIT-COND=1). 
As mentioned previously, permitting is a centerpiece of environmental legislation in Flanders 
and, generally speaking, the European Union. Looking at the type of pollution associated with 
the offense, we distinguish six different types by defining the appropriate indicators: offenses 
related to illegal waste treatment (WASTE), groundwater or soil pollution (SOIL-GROUND), 
noise pollution (NOISE), odor hindrance (ODOR), air pollution (mostly relating to dust) (AIR-
DUST) or surface water pollution (WATER). 
Variables concerning both the gravity of the facts and the culpability of the offender 
The indicator variable POSITIVE reflects whether the judgment mentioned if the offender took 
measures to remediate, clean up or solve the damages caused by the offenses. In first instance, 
some form of positive action was acknowledged for 23% of the offenders. 
Variables concerning the culpability of the offender 
The judgment can mention whether the offender was previously convicted (RECORD=1) or 
not for environmental or non-environmental offenses. In first instance some 13% of offenders 
had a criminal record. To measure the attitude of the offender, we use the indicator INTENT. 
The variable equals one if the judgment included at least one of the following terms: 
‘knowingly and willingly’, ‘unwillingness’, ‘purposefully’, ‘determined’ or ‘purpose’. In first 
instance, 11% of offenders scored positive on this variable. The judgment often explicitly 
mentioned if an offender acted in pursuit of gain and financially benefited from the offense. 
The indicator GAIN-SEEK equals one if the written motivation of the verdict used at least one 
of the terms ‘economic benefit’, ‘economic gain’, ‘financial gain’, ‘pursuit of gain’, ‘pursuit of 
profit’, or ‘profitable’. In first instance, 17% of offenders scored positive on this. 
4.4.3 Control variables 
Finally, we include a number of control variables to investigate the presence of systematic 
differences in judicial policies in different courts and in different years. The indicator variables 
BRUGGE, GENT, KORTRIJK, OUDENAARDE and WESTHOEK respectively reflect 
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whether the case was ruled on by the first instance court of Brugge, Gent, Kortrijk, Oudenaarde 
or in the Westhoek (i.e. Ieper and Veurne). The reference category is the court of first instance 
in Dendermonde. Also, the variables YEAR04, YEAR05 and YEAR06 represent whether a 
verdict was pronounced in respectively 2004, 2005 or 2006 (2003 is used as reference). 
 
V. Results 
We now turn to the results of the estimation and investigate the determinants of judicial 
decisions in Flanders. First we analyze judgments made by the courts of first instance for 
corporate entities and individuals respectively (5.1) and then we check if and how these 
judgments are subsequently changed by the appeal court for both groups of defendants (5.2). 
5.1 Courts of first instance 
To capture several dimensions of criminal enforcement, we study when prosecuted corporate 
entities and individuals are more likely to be acquitted and, if they were not acquitted, we 
estimated the level of the effective sanction as well as the level of a suspended sanction.  
5.1.1 Probability of acquittal 
Unsurprisingly, we find a highly significant negative impact of the fraction of proven 
accusations compared to the total number of accusations on the probability of being acquitted 
for corporate entities (see table 2) as well as individuals (see table 3).  
Moreover, corporate entities were less likely to be acquitted when prosecuted for an offense 
relating to the duty to have an environmental permit or conditions imposed by such a permit 
and when tried in Gent. They were more likely to be acquitted when tried in the Westhoek.  
Individuals had a lower probability of acquittal when offending in the course of professional 
activities and when prosecuted for an offense against environmental permit conditions. Their 
chances to be acquitted raised with the number of accusations faced and in the Westhoek.  
INSERT TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
5.1.2 Effective sanction 
Now we focus on the effective sanction, namely the sum of the effective fine and the monetary 
equivalent of the effective prison time, for corporate entities (table 2) and individuals (table 3). 
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Ceteris paribus, corporate entities received significantly higher effective sanctions when they 
committed prioritized offenses, in cases including civil parties, for waste offenses, offenses 
causing odor hindrance or water pollution, when they acted with intent or from a financial 
motive and when tried in Gent. They got lower effective sanctions when they undertook action 
to put an end to the offense and its negative effects. 
The effective sanctions inflicted to individuals were more stringent when sanctioning 
prioritized offenses, in cases causing negative health impacts or involving civil parties, for 
breaches of the duty to have an environmental permit, waste offenses and offenses causing 
odor hindrance and when the offender had a record of previous convictions or acted from 
financial motives. Individuals got significantly lower effective sanctions when the offended in 
their professional capacity, took action to put an end to the offense and its negative effects, or 
were convicted in Brugge or Kortrijk or in the year 2004. 
5.1.3  Suspended sanction 
Next we investigate the factors determining the level of the suspended sanction. A suspended 
sanction was added to the effective sanction for 45% of the convicted offenders14. 
Firstly, for corporate entities (see table 2) we find that the higher the imposed effective 
sanction, the higher the level of the imposed suspended sanction. Thus, when the judge in first 
instance increases the effective sanction, he will also increase the suspended sanction. This 
result points to a general cumulative use of effective and suspended sanctions for corporate 
entities. Moreover, corporate entities received a higher suspended sanction when they took 
action to put an end to the offense and its negative effects, or when tried in Gent. They were 
given lower suspended sanctions when facing a higher number of accusations, or for offenses 
with a negative health impact or involving civil parties. 
Regarding individuals (see table 3), we find that judges imposed a significantly higher 
suspended sanction on offenders acting within their professional capacity. The variables 
concerning the gravity of the facts have a clear impact: the suspended sanction was 
significantly higher for offenses that lasted a long time, prioritized offenses, offenses 
threatening public or private health or involving civil parties, waste offenses and offenses 
implying soil and groundwater contamination. Intentional offenders and offenders acting from 
                                                            
14 This documents a marked evolution in sentencing practices in Flanders. Twenty years ago, Faure (1990) knew 
only of a handful environmental cases where criminal courts pronounced a conviction with suspended sanctions. 
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financial motives also received higher suspended sanctions. Individuals got lower suspended 
sanctions for offenses related to permit conditions, or when tried in Brugge or Oudenaarde. 
5.2 Court of Appeal 
After the verdict in first instance is given, all parties involved have the opportunity to start the 
appeal process in which case for our dataset the case is brought before the Court of Appeal of 
Gent. First we discuss the probability that an appeal is initiated by one or more of the involved 
parties and next we investigate what case characteristics induce the Court of Appeal to modify 
the original verdict. Remember that the public prosecutor’s office is one of the parties 
appealing the verdict in all our cases, which implies that the appeal judge is free not only to 
alleviate but also to strengthen the original sanction. 
5.2.1 Probability of appeal 
While the probability of appeal is not part of the judicial sanctioning decision process, we still 
need to estimate the probability to correct for a potential sample selection bias (see table 4 for 
corporate entities and table 5 for individuals). 
Regarding corporate entities, we find that verdicts with higher effective sanctions are less 
likely to be appealed and that this decrease in the probability of appeal becomes larger as 
sanction levels become higher. Thus it seems that the public prosecutor appeals the (too low) 
verdicts, rather than the convicted corporations appealing (too high) sanctions. Also, an appeal 
is significantly more likely for cases that involve a threat to public or private health.   
Regarding individuals, the probability of an appeal is significantly higher for cases where the 
individual offender is acting in his professional capacity, for cases where the offenses threaten 
the public or private health, cases including civil parties, cases dealing with permit obligations, 
soil or groundwater pollution and for cases that were tried in the first instance court of Gent. 
The probability of an appeal significantly decreases for cases concerning prioritized offenses 
and cases where the offender took measures to put an end to the offense and its negative 
effects. Also there seems to be a decreasing probability of appeal over time15. 
INSERT TABLE 4 AND TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
                                                            
15 This observation might be due to a bias in our data collection since the appeal procedure of the later cases might 
not have been finished in 2007 and would then not be included in our dataset.  
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5.2.2 Changes in effective and suspended sanctions 
We now analyze the changes that the appeal court made to the sanctions imposed by the courts 
of first instance for corporate entities (see table 4) and for individuals (see table 5).  
Several of the judicial policy lines followed by lower courts are implicitly confirmed by the 
appeal judge, since these policy lines are not modified in appeal. Specifically for corporate 
entities these include: 1) the general cumulative use of suspended and effective sanctions, 2) 
the higher effective sanctions in cases that include civil parties, for intentional offenders, for 
gain seeking defendants, and for cases tried by the lower court of Gent; 3) the lower effective 
sanctions imposed on defendants who took action to end the offense and its negative effects; 4) 
the higher suspended sanctions imposed on defendants who made efforts to end the offense and 
reduce its negative effects; and 5) the lower suspended sanctions for offenses with a negative 
health impact. Further for individuals these include: 1) the higher effective sanctions for 
prioritized offenses, offenses with a negative health impact, breaches of the environmental 
permitting obligation, waste and odor offenses, and gain seeking defendants; 2) the lower 
effective sanctions imposed on professionals and on defendants who took action to end the 
offense and to reduce its effects; and 3) the higher suspended sanctions imposed on 
professionals, offenses with a negative health impact, waste offenses, offenses related to soil 
and ground water pollution and intentional offenders. 
Several other judicial policy lines followed by the lower courts are modified – strengthened or 
weakened – by the appeal judge. For corporate entities we find that the effective sanction 
increased for prioritized offenses, for waste offenses, noise hindrance and offenses related to 
soil and groundwater pollution. The effective sanction for corporate entities reduced for 
offenses that caused harm to vulnerable habitats, fauna and flora, and for water pollution. Also, 
the suspended sanction for corporate entities increased for prioritized offenses, noise 
hindrance, air pollution, water pollution, and gain seeking offenders. It decreased for offenses 
detected by the Flemish Environmental Inspection Agency, cases including civil parties, waste 
offenses, offenders with a criminal record, and for cases tried by the lower court of Gent. 
For individuals we find that the changes in suspended sanction are negatively correlated with 
the changes in effective sanction made by appeal judges. This points to a general use of 
suspended and effective sanctions as substitutes, contrary to the results found in first instance 
where judges seem to use both types of sanctions independent of each other. Further, we 
observe that the effective sanction is increased by the appeal judge for violations of the 
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permitting obligations, noise pollution, offenders with a criminal record and intentional 
offenders. Effective sanctions are reduced for cases including civil parties. Also, the suspended 
sanction for individuals is increased in appeal for offenses that caused harm to vulnerable 
habitats, fauna and flora and for gain seeking offenders. It is decreased for offenses detected by 
the Flemish Environmental Inspection Agency, for prioritized offences, cases including civil 
parties, offenses against permit conditions and for offenders with a criminal record. 
 
VI. Discussion 
The series of estimations described in the previous sections provide a unique picture of judicial 
policy lines developed by criminal courts in Flanders concerning the punishment of 
environmental offenses. The policy lines we were able to positively identify are not necessarily 
the result of deliberate policy choices by the judges, they might also be the result of 
unintentional – but real – sanctioning strategies. The estimated policy trends allow us to 
comment on the validity of the hypotheses formulated in section 3. 
6.1 First hypothesis 
The first hypothesis states that the effect on the imposed penalty of easily verifiable 
characteristics related to the gravity of the facts is expected to dominate more subjective or less 
tangible case characteristics. We find evidence to support this hypothesis. First instance courts 
impose higher effective sanctions to corporate entities committing offenses involving civil 
parties and for offenses of which the environmental impact is directly observable, such as those 
related to waste and surface water pollution. For individuals the same holds regarding cases 
involving civil parties and for waste offenses. Also, corporations as well as individuals got 
lower effective sanctions when they took action to end the illegal situation and limit its impact. 
Moreover, the appeal court confirms or even strengthens most of these policy lines. The lack of 
environmental specialization in Flemish courts might contribute to these results. Thus, our 
findings possibly connect with an internationally debated policy question, namely the need for 
specialized environmental courts (e.g. Pring and Pring 2009). 
6.2 Second hypothesis 
Our second hypothesis states that, as suspended penalties are considered as a less stringent 
substitute for effective penalties, the stringency of effective and suspended penalties has to be 
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negatively correlated. Surprisingly, our results contradict this hypothesis. We find that 
suspended sanctions are commonly used in two ways: to soften the stringency of the 
punishment through a substitutive use with effective penalties and to increase the stringency of 
punishment through a cumulative use with effective penalties. We find this insight for the first 
instance courts as well as the appeal court. Our results display an array of policy strategies in 
the combination of a substitutive and a cumulative use of effective and suspended sanctions.  
For corporate entities, we find a general positive correlation between effective and suspended 
penalties in the judgments of the courts of first instance that is confirmed in appeal, where it is 
even strengthened for prioritized offenses and offenses creating noise hindrance, air pollution 
or dust hindrance. This points to a common cumulative use of effective and suspended 
penalties for this group of offenders. This bottom line in the sanctioning policy is nuanced by a 
substitutive use for specific offenses and offenders. Courts of first instance use suspended 
penalties as a means of leniency for offenses harming public or private health, cases involving 
civil parties, offenders that took action to limit the resulting damage and offenders acting from 
gain seeking motives. The Court of Appeal of Gent confirms this substitutive use for offenses 
with a negative health impact and for offenders that took positive action. Additionally, the 
appeal judges use effective and suspended sanctions as substitutes for offenses relating to 
waste and to surface water pollution. For corporations offending from gain seeking motives, 
they modify the substitutive use to a cumulative use of both sanctions. 
For individuals, we find at first instance level neither a general cumulative nor a general 
substitutive use of effective and suspended sanctions. However, we do find specific instances 
of each type of use of both sanctions. At the appeal level, interestingly, there appears to be a 
general negative correlation between the change in effective and suspended sanctions pointing 
at a common substitutive use of both sanctions by the appeal judges. The common use of 
suspended sanctions as a means of leniency by the appeal court is nuanced by results that 
display a cumulative use of both sanctions. This striking difference in sanctioning policy for 
corporations and individuals fits the historical roots of the suspended sanction, namely its 
origin as a substitute for effective prison sentences to avoid an overcrowding of prisons and 
reintegration problems with former convicts. This historic rationale does not apply for 
corporations and is thus more easy to disregard for such offenders than for individuals. While 
at first instance level, we do not find a general trend of a cumulative use of effective and 
suspended penalties, we do observe that the first instance judges quite commonly use both 
types of sanctions cumulatively, namely for long lasting offenses, prioritized offenses, offenses 
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with negative health impacts, cases involving civil parties, waste offenses, offenses causing 
soil and groundwater pollution, intentional offenders and gain seeking offenders. On the other 
hand, they use effective and suspended sanctions as substitutes for professional defendants and 
for offenses breaching environmental permit conditions. The cumulative use is confirmed or 
strengthened by the appeal judges in most of the aforementioned instances, the cases involving 
prioritized offences and civil parties excepted. Further the appeal court introduces a cumulative 
use of both types of sanctions for offenses harming ecosystems, fauna or flora. Moreover, the 
appeal court confirms the use of effective and suspended sanctions as substitutes for 
professional offenders and strengthens such use for offenses breaching environmental permit 
conditions. Also, it opts for such sanctioning policy for offenses detected by the Environmental 
Inspection Agency, for prioritized offences, hereby reversing a cumulative use at first instance 
level, and for repeat offenders. 
6.3 Third hypothesis 
The third hypothesis states that judgments from the courts of first instance are more likely to 
reflect the core goals of environmental law, namely the protection of the environment for 
anthropocentric reasons (public health), the intrinsic value of the natural environment as such, 
or both these motives. Judgments from the court of appeal, on the other hand, would be more 
likely to reflect the core goals and principles of criminal law, namely the protection of the 
individual’s life and physical integrity, the protection of individual property and personal guilt 
as justification for punishment.  
Looking at the measures for the gravity of the facts, we find that the environmental case law 
created by the courts of first instance for both corporate entities and individuals reflects the 
dominant trends in environmental policy: 1) the gravity of the facts in terms of harm for the 
individual and the environment weighs heavily on the sanctioning decision 2) prioritized 
offenses such as the environmental permit obligation are strictly convicted, and 3) positive 
actions to end an illegal situation and to limit the associated harm are highly encouraged. These 
policy lines are all the more striking because achieved by a dominantly cumulative use of 
effective and suspended penalties that breaks with the historical rationale of both sanctions. 
Looking at the measures for guilt, gain-seeking reasons for offending are the most rigorously 
deterred, reflecting an instrumental approach of guilt. Thus, we find that the verdicts of the 
courts of first instance reflect the core goals of environmental policy and law, namely 
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protection of the environment for the sake of individuals and of nature as such, more closely 
than those of criminal law.  
Looking at the sanctioning decisions of the appeal court, we find a different focus since the 
basic criteria related to the seriousness of the offense are interpreted differently. Regarding the 
gravity of the facts, there is evidence of a more pronounced anthropocentric emphasis than in 
lower courts. Waste problems, which often are physically offending for the local population, 
and classical nuisance problems such as noise and dust (large part of air pollution cases) are 
punished more severely, while damage to nature leads to lower effective sanctions. On the 
other hand, also prioritized offenses and breaches of permit conditions are punished more 
severely than in first instance. Thus, the judicial policy of the appeal judge shows recognition 
of the core values of environmental law in its protection of individuals against damage and 
nuisance. However, this policy also relates strongly to one of the core values of classic criminal 
law, namely the protection of the physical integrity of the citizen. The environmental case law 
produced by the court of appeal can be situated at the exact point where environmental and 
criminal law have synergies. Turning to the measures of culpability, these findings are 
confirmed. Previous convictions and intentional offending enhance the penalties in appeal as 
compared to first instance on the one hand, thus demonstrating that appeal judges attach even 
more weight to the classic standards for the defendant’s specific guilt in the case under 
consideration than the judges in first instance. Yet, on the other hand, the gain seeking motive 
is punished even more severely in appeal than in first instance, which indicates appeal judges 
consider this more instrumental measure for guilt too.  
For the sum of these reasons, our analysis paints a picture of judges of first instance as criminal 
judges enforcing environmental law. However, at the appeal level, classic criminal law indeed 
is more present, even if, interestingly, it is affirmed in a way that achieves a synthesis of 
environmental and classic criminal law goals. Thus, we can confirm of our third hypothesis. 
6.4 Some additional findings 
The attention paid to actual as well as potential harm is completely in line with law and 
economic insights on the determinants of the optimal penalty (e.g. Polinsky and Shavell 1992) 
and with principles underpinning sound environmental policy worldwide, such as the principle 
of preventive action, endorsed e.g. by Article 192(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. On the other hand, the anthropocentric focus combined with the disregard of 
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the intrinsic value of the natural environment reveals preferences in punishment practices that 
are not in line with the policy aims of the enforced environmental legislation.  
Next, the mild treatment of individuals who committed offenses within their professional 
capacity is noteworthy, especially when confronted with the observation that they are treated 
milder than individuals committing similar offenses in their private capacity. This might be 
explained by the fact that individuals offending in their professional capacity are more likely to 
be simultaneously prosecuted with a corporate entity (49% versus 13%), suggesting a trade-off 
in punishing more than one offender simultaneously.  
Also, our data do not reveal temporal trends, while we do observe marked differences in 
sanctioning decisions over judicial districts. Offenders judged in Brugge or Kortrijk are clearly 
better off, while those judged in Gent receive significantly higher sanctions. Even though the 
relatively stricter verdicts of the court in Gent are appealed to more often, the Court of Appeal 
of Gent seems to confirm these stricter sanctions in general. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Judicial decision making is often treated as a black box and empirical evidence on criminal 
environmental sanctioning decisions from both lower courts and appeal courts is very scarce. 
Our analysis of environmental case law in Flanders paints an intriguing and insightful picture 
of judicial policy lines. The sanctioning policy of judges is varied as well as consistent. Judges 
carefully balance effective and suspended penalties: mostly using them cumulatively, but in 
specific cases opting to use them as substitutes. Overall, both lower courts and the appeal court 
balance environmental and criminal law and aim at protecting individuals and their possessions 
as well as the environment. The appeal court, however, seems to be influenced more by classic 
criminal law as shown, for instance, by its treatment of culpability. 
Also, the results provide evidence of several predictions from existing (law and) economic 
literature on the punishment of offenses (Polinsky and Shavell, 1994; Garoupa, 2001; Cohen, 
1992). Penalties are increasing with the level of harm caused, be it that some types of harm 
matter more than others. Repeat offenders and intentional offenders receive higher penalties. 
However, the results also provide insights that are not generally incorporated in the literature, 
specifically regarding the judicial use of suspended and effective penalties as instruments to 
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imposed milder as well as stricter punishment. Suspended penalties are a sanctioning option 
within the criminal law of many countries. The use of suspended penalties is especially 
intriguing and deserves more attention in future work. Suspended penalties are generally 
considered as a sign of leniency when they replace effective penalties, however they still deter 
future offenses. Interestingly, suspended penalties can also be used to increase the stringency 
of the imposed penalty through a cumulative use of both suspended and effective penalties. 
The role of suspended sanctions as either carrot or stick certainly values additional research.  
To conclude, the current study provides a unique view of punishment policy by criminal 
judges. The generality of the results is corroborated by the evidence we provide on generally 
used assumptions and models. However, it would be very interesting to see a similar analysis 
of environmental case law in other jurisdictions to distinguish between general and specific 
results. Also, the analysis points at an internationally discussed policy question, namely the 
need for specialized environmental courts. It would be interesting to investigate which findings 
result from the lack of specialization of the Flemish courts and how judicial policy might 
change if specialization occurred. Further, the strong focus put by Flemish criminal judges on 
remedial action by defendants when deciding on punishment, contrasted with the scarce use of 
remedial sanctions, intrigues as an element in the study of restorative justice. Could it, for 
instance, be presumed that restorative environmental justice by means of remedial orders 
somehow does not fit in the criminal sanctioning system? Finally, it would be interesting to 
look at the interaction between the public prosecutor and the criminal judge. At least two 
dimensions seem relevant: firstly, the relation between the type and level of the sanction 
requested by the public prosecutor and the type and level of the sanction imposed by the 
criminal judges and secondly, the impact of actual judicial policy relating to environmental 
sanctioning on the prosecution policy. 
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Appendix A: Legislation included in the dataset 
Our study focuses on environmental pollution legislation. The selection of environmental case 
law in the period 2003 – 2007 includes all cases where at least one accusation concerned a 
breach of one of the following parliament acts or associated implementing government orders: 
Air Pollution Act 1964, Pesticides Act 1969, Surface Water Act 1971, Noise Pollution Act 
1973, Flemish Waste Act 1981, Flemish Groundwater Act 1984, Flemish Environmental 
Permitting Act 1985 and Flemish Environmental Policy Act 1995. Breaches of exploitation 
permits based on the Labor Safety Order 1946 (Title 1. Regime of installations categorized as 
dangerous, unhealthy or hazardous. B.R. 11 February 1946 on the General Code of Labor 
Protection) are also included since this legislation precedes the current environmental permit 
based on the Flemish Environmental Permitting Act 1985; in 2003-2007 a large number of 
firms in Flanders still worked with such Labor Safety permits. The study also includes 
legislation that was recently cancelled, namely the Flemish Manure Act 1991 and Flemish Soil 
Cleanup Act 1995. Those acts were replaced by, respectively, the Flemish Manure Act 2006 
and the Flemish Soil Act 2006, whom both are strongly inspired by the older laws they replace. 
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APPENDIX B: Definition of dependent and explanatory variables 
 
VARIABLE NAME DEFINITION 
Dependent variables 
CONV =1 if judge does not acquit defendant; =0 else 
LN(EFFSAN) = logarithm of the level of the effective sanction  
LN(SUSSAN) = logarithm of the level of the suspended sanction 
APPEAL =1 if at least one party appealed the initial verdict; =0 else 
DIF-EFFSAN = difference between effective sanction in appeal and effective sanction 
in first instance (in euro) 
DIF-SUSSAN = difference between suspended sanction in appeal and suspended 
sanction in first instance (in euro) 
Explanatory variables 
Type of offender 
PROF =1 if offender is individual offending during professional activities; =0 
else 
Gravity of the facts 
COUNT ACC 
PROVEN ACC 
= count of total number of accusations 
= fraction of proven accusations compared to total accusations 
DURATION = length of longest-lasting offense expressed in days 
EPA =1 if offense detected by environmental inspection agency; =0 else 
PRIORITY =1 if offense classified as a prioritized offense; =0 else 
NATURE =1 if offense damaged  ecosystem, fauna or flora; =0 else 
HEALTH =1 if offense damaged public and/or private health; =0 else 
CIVIL PARTY =1 if civil party (parties) are involved in the case; =0 else 
PERMIT =1 if offense involved a breach of obligation to have a valid 
environmental permit; =0 else 
PERMIT-COND =1 if offense involved a breach of conditions of environmental permit; 
=0 else 
WASTE =1 if offense related to illegal waste treatment or disposal; =0 else 
SOIL-GROUND =1 if offense related to soil or groundwater contamination; =0 else 
NOISE =1 if offense related to noise pollution; =0 else 
ODOR =1 if offense related to odor nuisance; =0 else 
AIR-DUST =1 if offense related to air pollution or dust nuisance; =0 else 
WATER =1 if offense related to water pollution; =0 else 
Gravity of the facts and culpability of the offender
POSITIVE =1 if offender took positive action to limit damage; =0 else 
Culpability of the offender 
RECORD =1 if offender was previously criminally convicted; =0 else 
INTENT =1 if offender was mentioned to have offended intentionally; =0 else 
GAIN-SEEK =1 if offender was mentioned to have offended in pursuit of gain; =0 
else 
Control variables 
BRUGGE =1 if verdict of court of first instance of Brugge; =0 else 
GENT =1 if verdict of court of first instance of Gent; =0 else 
KORTRIJK =1 if verdict of court of first instance of Kortrijk; =0 else 
OUDENAARDE =1 if verdict of court of first instance of Oudenaarde; =0 else 
WESTHOEK =1 if verdict of court of first instance of Ieper or Veurne; =0 else 
YEAR04 =1 if verdict was pronounced in 2004; =0 else 
YEAR05 =1 if verdict was pronounced in 2005; =0 else 
YEAR06 
LAMBDA 
=1 if verdict was pronounced in 2006; =0 else 
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Table 1 : Main criminal sanctions (individuals) 
Main criminal sanctions First instance Appeal 








Only fine 895 87.49 % 117 82.40 % 
Only prison sentence 1 0.10 % 3 2.11 % 
Prison sentence and fine 102 9.97 % 18 12.68 % 
Community service 17 1.66 % 1 0.70 % 
Other 8 0.78 % 3 2.11 % 




Table 2: Estimation of criminal sanction in first instance for corporate entities 
CORPORATE 
ENTITIES 
CONV LN(EFFSAN) LN(PROBSAN) 
Coeff st.dev. P-value Coeff st.dev. P-value Coeff st.dev. P-value
constant -1.0643 0.3604 0.0030 5.7380 0.7084 0.0000 -0.5690 1.0244 0.5790
ln(effsan)       0.4980 0.0865 0.0000
proven acc 2.3649 0.3657 0.0000       
count acc -0.0135 0.0785 0.8630 -0.0894 0.0908 0.3240 -0.2468 0.1115 0.0270
duration 0.0001 0.0002 0.6280 0.0001 0.0003 0.6180 0.0002 0.0003 0.5430
EPA    -0.0191 0.4522 0.9660 -0.1816 0.5783 0.7530
priority -0.2100 0.3379 0.5340 1.3443 0.4805 0.0050 0.1671 0.6039 0.7820
nature    -0.6645 1.0998 0.5460 0.7650 1.4332 0.5930
health    -0.9145 0.7495 0.2220 -2.3568 0.9366 0.0120
civil party 0.4676 0.5020 0.3520 0.8938 0.5065 0.0780 -1.4127 0.6209 0.0230
permit 0.5938 0.3424 0.0830 0.2803 0.4669 0.5480 -0.0880 0.5776 0.8790
permit-cond 0.6377 0.3298 0.0530 -0.0881 0.4601 0.8480 0.0376 0.5711 0.9470
waste    1.0288 0.5164 0.0460 0.8411 0.6620 0.2040
soil-ground    0.9778 0.6162 0.1130 1.1603 0.8019 0.1480
noise    1.0168 0.5383 0.0590 0.5452 0.6917 0.4310
odor    2.0242 0.7617 0.0080 0.4682 0.9881 0.6360
air-dust    -2.3580 1.6953 0.1640 -0.5574 2.1115 0.7920
water    1.2927 0.6210 0.0370 -0.3483 0.8090 0.6670
positive    -1.5236 0.4383 0.0010 1.6088 0.5768 0.0050
record    0.7870 0.9560 0.4100 1.3688 1.2528 0.2750
intent    1.0174 0.5298 0.0550 0.3632 0.6753 0.5910
gain-seek    0.9287 0.4789 0.0520 -1.0788 0.6167 0.0800
Brugge 0.6344 0.6492 0.3280 -0.9879 1.0051 0.3260 -1.4525 1.2524 0.2460
Gent 0.7407 0.4133 0.0730 1.2013 0.5742 0.0360 1.6195 0.7217 0.0250
Kortrijk 0.1564 0.5644 0.7820 0.4291 0.8737 0.6230 1.0275 1.0884 0.3450
Oudenaarde    0.0578 0.8361 0.9450 -1.3877 1.0952 0.2050
Westhoek -0.5759 0.3449 0.0950 -0.6822 0.7343 0.3530 0.0931 0.9255 0.9200
year04    0.1399 0.5849 0.8110 0.1548 0.7495 0.8360
year05    0.3733 0.5606 0.5050 0.2964 0.7227 0.6820
year06    -0.3673 0.5044 0.4660 -0.1336 0.6446 0.8360
lambda    -2.6384 0.8401 0.0020 -0.9419 1.2342 0.4450
# obs 253  220 220  
Wald chi2   101.36 90.73  




Table 3: Estimation of criminal sanction in first instance for individuals 
INDIVIDUALS CONV LN(EFFSAN) LN(PROBSAN) 
 Coeff st.dev. P-value Coeff st.dev. P-value Coeff st.dev. P-value
constant -0.7446 0.1628 0.0000 4.7979 0.3333 0.0000 1.8441 0.4651 0.0000
ln(effsan)       -0.0420 0.0383 0.2730
professional 0.2452 0.1447 0.0900 -0.8421 0.2168 0.0000 0.6855 0.2800 0.0140
proven acc 2.6665 0.1499 0.0000       
count acc -0.0752 0.0343 0.0290 0.0079 0.0603 0.8950 0.0663 0.0773 0.3910
duration -0.0001 0.0001 0.4960 0.0001 0.0001 0.3170 0.0005 0.0002 0.0030
EPA    0.1918 0.3169 0.5450 0.0772 0.4064 0.8490
priority 0.0374 0.1863 0.8410 0.7532 0.2709 0.0050 0.8382 0.3488 0.0160
nature    -0.3501 0.4743 0.4610 -0.3882 0.6081 0.5230
health    0.8181 0.4411 0.0640 1.4297 0.5664 0.0120
civil party 0.4826 0.2968 0.1040 0.5236 0.2661 0.0490 0.5733 0.3421 0.0940
permit 0.0175 0.1841 0.9240 0.7401 0.2620 0.0050 0.1674 0.3374 0.6200
permit-cond 0.4306 0.2192 0.0500 -0.0272 0.2639 0.9180 -0.8428 0.3386 0.0130
waste    0.8657 0.2670 0.0010 0.6485 0.3439 0.0590
soil-ground    -0.4566 0.3457 0.1870 1.1052 0.4434 0.0130
noise    0.4414 0.3396 0.1940 0.3680 0.4358 0.3980
odor    0.9598 0.5143 0.0620 0.8283 0.6603 0.2100
air-dust    0.4692 0.5589 0.4010 0.3213 0.7165 0.6540
water    0.1133 0.3312 0.7320 0.4221 0.4246 0.3200
positive    -1.4256 0.2380 0.0000 0.3610 0.3099 0.2440
record    1.4687 0.2514 0.0000 -0.0689 0.3271 0.8330
intent    -0.3016 0.3026 0.3190 0.8536 0.3881 0.0280
gain-seek    1.9568 0.2805 0.0000 0.7969 0.3674 0.0300
Brugge -0.0423 0.2311 0.8550 -1.2688 0.3429 0.0000 -1.2740 0.4426 0.0040
Gent 0.0228 0.1608 0.8870 0.0397 0.2265 0.8610 -0.2209 0.2906 0.4470
Kortrijk 0.3011 0.3138 0.3370 -0.8844 0.3619 0.0150 -0.5303 0.4656 0.2550
Oudenaarde    -0.0515 0.3777 0.8910 -0.9175 0.4843 0.0580
Westhoek -0.3858 0.1963 0.0490 0.0296 0.3425 0.9310 -0.5925 0.4393 0.1770
year04    -0.4655 0.2643 0.0780 -0.0827 0.3393 0.8070
year05    0.2012 0.2527 0.4260 -0.0169 0.3241 0.9580
year06    -0.2799 0.2526 0.2680 -0.4527 0.3240 0.1620
Lambda    -0.2611 0.4422 0.5550 -0.6109 0.5652 0.2800
# obs 1266  1123 1123  
Wald chi2   430.04 157.93  
Prob > chi2   0 0  
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Table 4: Estimation of change in criminal sanction in appeal for corporate entities 
CORPORATE 
ENTITIES 
APPEAL DIF-EFFSAN DIF-SUSSAN 
Coeff st.dev. p-value Coeff st.dev. p-value Coeff st.dev. p-value
constant -0.8551 0.3890 0.0280 -34582 18777 0.0660 5401 2779 0.0520
ln(effsan) -0.3464 0.1555 0.0260      
ln(effsan)² 0.0433 0.0169 0.0100      
dif-effsan   -0.0436 0.0272 0.1090
EPA 21623 16608 0.1930 -6343 2386 0.0080
priority -0.5974 0.5377 0.2670 22846 13628 0.0940 5792 2010 0.0040
nature -1.6927 2.3587 0.4730 -298501 13786 0.0000 -11829 8357 0.1570
health 2.1764 0.7349 0.0030 -15334 15227 0.3140 3076 2203 0.1630
civil party 0.2061 0.5329 0.6990 -12243 8848 0.1660 -7921 1311 0.0000
permit -0.1256 0.3693 0.7340 -21048 14286 0.1410 -1398 2119 0.5100
permit-cond -0.1300 0.3375 0.7000 -2244 5944 0.7060 -1194 860 0.1650
waste 43327 14703 0.0030 -4793 2273 0.0350
soil-ground 32790 15200 0.0310 -2567 2239 0.2520
noise 42608 12847 0.0010 4498 2097 0.0320
air-dust 24999 17956 0.1640 8578 2672 0.0010
water -38309 14473 0.0080 9050 2298 0.0000
positive -0.3806 0.4373 0.3840 1591 13056 0.9030 276 1840 0.8810
record 0.5398 1.0201 0.5970 30201 19722 0.1260 -5453 2929 0.0630
intent -0.1475 0.4139 0.7220 -13352 10487 0.2030 -398 1501 0.7910
gain-seek 0.3238 0.4255 0.4470 -2146 10305 0.8350 3505 1454 0.0160
Gent 0.1556 0.4706 0.7410 -4418 9572 0.6440 -14152 1373 0.0000
Oudenaarde 1.0629 0.7982 0.1830      
Westhoek 0.3260 0.4467 0.4660      
year04 -0.3143 0.3802 0.4080      
year05 -2.4216 0.6956 0.0000      
year06 -2.5596 0.7415 0.0010      
lambda 1511 10302 0.8830 1071 1447 0.4590
# obs 252 28 28 
Wald chi2 81.13 727.48 242.81 




Table 5: Estimation of change in criminal sanction in appeal for individuals 
INDIVIDUALS APPEAL DIF-EFFSAN DIF-SUSSAN 
 Coeff st.dev. p-value Coeff st.dev. p-value Coeff st.dev. p-value
constant -2.3353 0.2749 0.0000 -101750 68894 0.1400 19501 69549 0.7790
ln(effsan) 0.0580 0.0557 0.2980         
ln(effsan)² 0.0030 0.0055 0.5810         
dif-effsan   -0.2015 0.1137 0.0760
professional 0.2996 0.1620 0.0640 -12559 20836 0.5470 16241 20587 0.4300
EPA    -11471 24060 0.6340 -88885 24235 0.0000
priority -0.4537 0.2382 0.0570 -34820 35572 0.3280 -58693 35682 0.1000
nature -0.3795 0.4384 0.3870 -63650 54773 0.2450 100690 53843 0.0610
health 0.6992 0.3319 0.0350 -55134 45557 0.2260 -26957 45486 0.5530
civil party 0.3313 0.1957 0.0900 -44192 23238 0.0570 -90052 23236 0.0000
permit 0.3563 0.1790 0.0470 -3191 23990 0.8940 11775 23582 0.6180
permit-cond 0.0743 0.1972 0.7060 70261 25987 0.0070 -61991 26883 0.0210
waste 0.1776 0.2098 0.3970 4482 26393 0.8650 -24808 26124 0.3420
soil-ground 0.4287 0.2473 0.0830 25491 31136 0.4130 12631 30814 0.6820
noise 0.4361 0.2627 0.0970 82003 34209 0.0170 35019 35152 0.3190
odor 0.3632 0.3594 0.3120 4361 45847 0.9240 27958 45250 0.5370
air-dust 0.1213 0.3560 0.7330 41162 46545 0.3770 -19084 46189 0.6790
water 0.1178 0.2578 0.6480 3880 32827 0.9060 -35378 32453 0.2760
positive -0.6267 0.2727 0.0220 -43385 48565 0.3720 70876 49713 0.1540
record 0.1523 0.1904 0.4240 39613 22689 0.0810 -40214 22503 0.0740
intent 0.2974 0.1966 0.1300 53409 25795 0.0380 37737 26090 0.1480
gain-seek -0.0434 0.2226 0.8450 -47597 29643 0.1080 59607 29818 0.0460
Gent 0.5154 0.1746 0.0030 -3141 23326 0.8930 14416 23214 0.5350
Oudenaarde 0.2950 0.3130 0.3460         
Westhoek 0.2195 0.2532 0.3860         
year04 -0.0862 0.1685 0.6090         
year05 -0.8544 0.2038 0.0000         
year06 -1.9806 0.3819 0.0000         
lambda    47372 27460 0.0850 -3954 27943 0.8870
# obs 1273   81  81   
Wald chi2    45  67.71   
Prob > chi2    0.0007   0   
 
